California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations

Office of Graduate Studies

12-2022

Information Flow Analysis in Multi-Level Security
Keerthi Prayojitha Bere

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Bere, Keerthi Prayojitha, "Information Flow Analysis in Multi-Level Security" (2022). Electronic Theses,
Projects, and Dissertations. 1592.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/1592

This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator
of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS IN MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY

A Project
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
in
Information Systems and Technology

by
Keerthi Prayojitha Bere
December 2022

INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS IN MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY

A Project
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

by
Keerthi Prayojitha Bere
December 2022
Approved by:

Joon Son, PhD., Committee Chair
Conrad Shayo, PhD., Committee Member
Conrad Shayo, PhD., Department Chair

© 2022 Keerthi Prayojitha Bere

ABSTRACT

1. The Bell-LaPadula Model enforces the Multilevel Security access control
policies by implementing simple security property and star property. No
published research has been done to identify vulnerable node in the
Information Flow Digraph and measure their level of vulnerability. In this
Culminating Experience Project, the Multilevel access control policy
digraph representing Bell-LaPadula Model was transformed into
Information Flow Digraph representing the information flow between the
Subject and Object. The questions for this project were: Q#1: How should
we interpret the critically identified nodes from the information flow
perspective (or in MLS context)? Q#2: If the critically important node(s) is
(are) compromised or polluted, what are the negative impacts that it (or
they) can bring to the whole network?
2. Our findings can be summarized by answering the above questions, The
answer for Q#1 is: The Betweenness Centrality algorithm is applied to this
information flow digraph, to identify the most important entities in the
network. These most important entities can be interpreted as the most
vulnerable nodes in the network from the Information flow perspective and
their vulnerability levels can also be measured. The answer for Q#2 is: If
these most vulnerable nodes are compromised then their polluted data
files can be propagated into the whole network in the shortest possible
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ways. The conclusion is that, by locating the important node by using
betweenness centrality algorithm, we show how this critically important
node can be interpreted in multilevel security context from the information
flow perspective. Areas for further study includes if an additional factor
such as security level is added to our model, we like to study how this
additional factor can change the way we identify the vulnerable nodes and
measure their vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Information Systems security has existed since an IT function was
established. Most private and public organizations understand that security is not
something that can be taken lightly. In fact, in a recent CompTIA's survey, 74% of
firms stated that information systems security is of higher priority today than it
was two years ago, while 85% of firms stated that it will have an even higher
priority in the next two years (CompTIA, 2015).

Access control plays a key role in protecting sensitive data by defining a
set of rules which grant or revoke access to the system resources. Many access
control models have been proposed and researched, including Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) (Sandhu & Munawer, 1998), Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) (Hu et al., 2011), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al.,
2000) and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) (Hu et al., 2015). Each model
has different rules as to how subjects can access objects.

No previous research has provided a formal way to identify vulnerable
entities in the network. (Logrippo, 2018) talks about information flow digraph but
does not provide a way to identify which entities are most vulnerable. In this
Culminating Experience Project, our main contribution is to identify the most
vulnerable entities and the level of vulnerability. To our existing knowledge, no
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published research has discussed which entity is most important in a multi-level
security context. The vulnerability of the network depends on the centrality
algorithm that is applied in our project. We used the betweenness centrality
which is a centrality algorithm used to detect or identify the amount of influence
that the node has on the network with respect to information flow.

The multilevel security access control policies focus more on
confidentiality when considering a network with an illicit information flow. The
benefit of doing this project is to determine the negative impact when this illicit
information flow is added by using the betweenness centrality algorithm. This can
help security professionals to identify the most vulnerable node when the network
is polluted.

Moreover, in this Culminating Experience Project, our focus is on the
Mandatory Access Control model in which various levels of security
classifications and clearances exist. A subject can be a user or process; and an
object can be a file or device in a network. The MAC model restricts a subject
based on the security classification of the object and the clearance attached to
the subject (Panossian, 2019).

The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is a core support for MAC and helps us to
fully utilize the Multi-Level Security policy (Hyun, 2020). The BLP model enforces
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MAC by only allowing a subject with a higher security level (High) to access an
object with a lower security level (Low), thus, information can flow only from Low
to High. The MLS access control policy enforcing the BLP model can be
represented by a directed graph (also known as a diagraph).

Figure 1: MLS Access Control Policy Digraph

In Figure 1, the nodes represent the subjects, objects or security labels
assigned to both subjects and objects. The edges represent the dominance
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relationships between security levels or system operations such as read or write
between the subject and object. Since there is no previous work done on this, we
call this digraph “MLS access control policy digraph”. We consider this MLS
access control policy digraph to contain an illicit information operation.

The MLS access control policy digraph can be transformed into a much
simpler digraph. The characteristics of the digraph are:
•

The nodes represent either subjects or objects.

•

The edges represent the direction of information flow between any

two nodes.

We call the graph shown in Figure 1.2, “information flow digraph”
Compared to MLS access control policy digraph, the major benefits of the
information flow digraph are:
•

The data flow between the subjects or objects can be easily traced

and compared to MLS access control policy digraphs.
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Figure 1.2 Information Flow Digraph

Interesting insights can be revealed by investigating the behavior of the
individual components and their interconnections in information flow digraphs.
Interactions between components and other entities can be understood by
studying graph nodes and how they are connected to each other over edges or
links. Data usually gets transferred between nodes (e.g., subjects and objects)
over these edges.

Our research has three main goals:
1.

Show a high-level description of how to transform MLS

access control policy digraph to an information flow digraph.
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2.

Demonstrate how to apply a well-known centrality algorithm

or measure to identify the critical nodes in an information flow
digraph analyze the results from the network analytic point of
view.
3.

Analyze the result obtained from the previous step from the

secure information flow perspective. Then we answer the following
questions:
a.

How should we interpret the critically identified nodes

from the information flow perspective (or in MLS context)?
b.

If the critically important node(s) is (are) compromised

or polluted, what are the negative impacts that it (or they)
can bring to the whole network?

Organization
The remainder of the project is organized as follows: Chapter 2
summarizes the literature review about the Multi-level Security and Information
Flow Digraph. Chapter 3 Discusses about the centrality measures and
Information Flow Digraph construction with example and in NetworkX as no
previous research has been done on this and then we calculate the betweenness
centrality in case of unweighted and weighted graphs. Chapter 4 explains about
how the information flow analysis can be done with real life example and in Multi-
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level Security Context. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary and future work that
is left to be done.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Multi-Level Security
The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is a computer security model which
focuses on Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) in military and government applications. The BLP model was developed
by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula, with the strong guidance of Roger
R. Schell, to formalize the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) multilevel security
(MLS) policy (Bell & LaPadula, 1976). This BLP model is a state transition model
of computer security policy which describes a bunch of access control rules.

In applications which enforce access controls, the subject and objects are
partitioned into different security levels. Multilevel Security policy applies these
access controls to various levels of processes with different rules for user access
at each level. If the users do not have the right level of authorization to run a
process at specific level, then that user will not be able to access the information.
The MLS implements the Bell-LaPadula model for system security.

The Bell-LaPadula model enforces the Multi-level Security access control
policies by implementing two simple properties:
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1. Simple security property: The simple security policy is also known as
“no read up”, i.e., no subject has the access to read an object with a
higher clearance level than the level of the subject.
2. *-property (“star property”): The *-property is also known as “no write
down”, i.e., no subject can write to an object with lower classification
level than current confidentiality level of the subject,

Figure 2.1 Bell-LaPadula Model Overview. (Panossian, 2019)

In a typical implementation, the security level labels range from most
secure, top secret, secret, and confidential (less secure). From figure 2.1, under
MLS a program configured as secret will be able to write to a file that is labelled
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as top secret but will not be able to read from it. Similarly, the same can be
permitted to read from and write to a file labelled as secret, but only to read
confidential files. Such kind of access control is called mandatory access control,
which according to the United States Department of Defense Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria is “a means of restricting access to objects based on
the sensitivity (label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal
authorization of subjects to access information of such sensitivity” (DoD 5200.28STD - Department Of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria December 26, L985, 1983).

As a result, we can conclude that information that passes through the
program can flow upwards through the hierarchy of security levels, but not
downwards and this concept can be used to construct an Information Flow
Digraph.

2.2 Information Flow Digraph
The study of graphs originates back to the eighteenth century, where
Leonhard Euler proposed a solution to the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg problem
and introduced graph theory (Scifo, 2020). The basic ways of defining graphs
originate from mathematics. A basic graph is composed of two main elements: a.
node and b. relationship. Each node represents an entity, a place, person, thing,
or any piece of data, and each relationship represents the association between
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two nodes. Combining the two edges with relationship would provide a graphical
representation and provides some meaningful information.

Figure 2.2 Graph Database Example (Panossian, 2019)

From figure 2.2, we can interpret that a person named John works in an
organization called Amazon and lives in California. A simple pragmatic concept
like this can increase the potential of a graph database in designing and
expressing access control model (Hyun, 2020).

In this paper we are using the Information flow graph to display the
information flow. The information flow graphs represented in this paper are
directed graphs or digraphs. The information flow digraph consists of nodes and
edges. The nodes in our information flow digraph are the entities which represent
various subjects and objects of the access control systems. The edges between
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these subjects and objects represent the data or information flow between these
entities.

Figure 2.3 Information Flow digraph

In the above figure 2.3, the entity S3 is the subject and the entity O3 is an
object, then an edge from S3 to O3 means the S3 can write on O3, while an
edge from O3 to S3 means that S3 can read from O3. This assumption
empowers us to adapt the results to several interpretations and contexts. Based
on another common assumption in security theory we can observe that, if data
can flow from S3 to O3, then any other data transmitted to S3 can also flow to
O3. This leads us to assume the transitivity of the data flow relationship, which
means if data can flow from S3 to O3, and data can flow from O3 to S2, then the
data can flow from S3 to S2. We should also note that there could be some
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amount of arbitrariness in the digraph, say for example the transitivity property in
the information flow digraph could include a greater number of information flows
as we are interpreting more arrows and there are no certain patterns for
digraphs, these patterns can be arbitrary as the data flows can be observed not
only between the Subjects and Objects, but also between Subjects and Subjects
and Objects and Objects.

Here we can observe that the nodes or objects S1 and O1 can transmit or
receive data from each other. From this we can conclude that the nodes S1 and
O1 can share all data or information that one node can originate or receive, the
other node can also receive. From this we can observe that the access control
system for this digraph is organized in such a way that information can only flow
upwards and not downwards i.e., the two goals of multilevel security a.
unauthorized individuals must be prevented from access information at higher
classification than their authorization and b. Controls must prevent any user from
declassifying the information are satisfied and from this we can assume that
Security levels are not needed to mention in the information flow digraph as it still
holds the Bell-LaPadula Policy.

Depending on the method use, the reduced number of edges and nodes
might make the digraphs tasks simpler and easier. It is interesting to observe that
there are efficient algorithms to construct component digraphs but one of the
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main goals of this Culminating Experience Project is only to focus on how to
transform MLS access control policy digraph to an information flow digraph. This
information flow digraph can be used for implementing the centrality measure to
identify the most important node in the network.
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CHAPTER THREE
CENTRALITY MEASURE

The main goal of social network analysis research is to calculate centrality
(Freeman, 1978). In graph theory and network analysis centrality indicators
assign numbers or ranking to nodes in the graph with respect to their positions
(“Centrality,” 2022). Centrality measures are important because it indicates which
nodes or entities occupies the most critical positions in the network. Degree
centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and eigen vector centrality
are the most frequently used measures of centrality (Freeman, 1978).

This Culminating Experience Project focuses on the BetweennessCentrality (BC) measure to identify the most critical node in an information flow
digraph. Betweenness centrality is a commonly used metric which is based on
shortest path computation. The nodes with high centrality are the ones that
strongly affect other nodes in the network due to their strong connections.

The structure of this section is as follows: we will first go through the
information flow digraph construction, information flow digraph construction using
NetworkX. NetworkX(NetworkX, 2022) is a python package for complex graph
network analysis. It can be used to create, manipulate, and study the structure,
dynamics, and functions of complex graph networks. Next, we will discuss how to
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implement Between Centrality measure and identify the most important node
within the Information Flow Digraph (IFD).

3.1 Information Flow Digraph Construction
As far as we know no research shows on how a network with Multilevel
Security access control with Bell-LaPadula policy can be transformed into an
Information Flow Digraph. We did not develop any mathematical formula, but we
will describe how can we transform the network with MAC to Information Flow
Digraph.

Figure 3.1 BLP Properties and Information Flow
(Panossian, 2019)
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In the figure 3.1, we can see that the read and write operations can be
converted into the edges with information flow. If we say, there is a read
operation from a high security level to low security level, then in this operation the
information flows from low security level to high security level. This means that in
an information flow graph the information only flows from low security levels to
high security levels which obeys the Bell-LaPadula Policy. Hence there is no
need for displaying the security level of nodes in the information flow digraph.

3.2 Information Flow Digraph Construction in NetworkX
For constructing the information flow digraph with respect to Bell-LaPadula
policy using NetworkX, we first need to import the libraries such as pandas for
reading the dataset files, network for network creation or analysis and
matplotlib.pyplot for plotting the graphs.

Figure 3.2 Importing Important Libraries
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In figure 3.3, we are importing and uploading the Nodes.csv file which we created
for constructing the nodes in the network.

Figure 3.3 Code to Import and Upload Files

After importing and loading the file, as we can see in figure 3.4, we create
a variable called nodes and store the Nodes.csv file in that Pandas data frame.

Figure 3.4 To Store Dataset in Pandas Data Frame

From figure 3.5, we can use head() function which displays the top rows of
the dataset to see that it is successfully loaded into the nodes data frame.
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Figure 3.5 Head() function

In figure 3.6, we are importing and uploading the Edges3.csv file which we
created for constructing the relationships between the nodes in the network.

Figure 3.6 Code to Import and Upload Files

After importing and loading the file, as we can see in figure 3.7, we create
a variable called edges and store the Edges.csv file in that Pandas data frame.
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Figure 3.7 Storing Dataset in Pandas Data Frame

From figure 3.8, we can use head() function which displays the top rows of
the dataset to see that it is successfully loaded into the nodes data frame.

Figure 3.8 Head() to Display Top Rows of Edges Data Frame
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In figure 3.9, edges.shape will result with the number of rows and
columns. Here we can observe that the edges data frame has 33 rows and 3
columns.

Figure 3.9 Function to Display Number of Rows and Columns

In figure 3.10, we are creating a variable called G_directed and using
from_pandas_edgelist() to return a graph from Pandas Data Frame containing a
list of edges. The attributes of the Pandas Data Frame (edges) should contain
node names and edge attributes. The edges data frame is the first attribute for
this function, the source attribute is the column name for the source nodes in
constructing the relationships. The target attribute is for the target nodes and
edge_attr is the column name which can be used to iterate and retrieve items
and then add them to the graph as edge attributes if it marked as True. In this
case we are creating an Information Flow Digraph hence for create_using
attribute we are giving DiGraph() type to create. To draw the graph with edge
labels we use the nx.draw().
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Figure 3.10 For Creating Directed Graph using Edgelist

In figure 3.11 below, we can see the graph with the nodes and directed
edges which represents the Information flow digraph. We assume that this
information flow digraph holds Bell-LaPadula policies, and that Information does
not leak from higher to lower classification levels.

Figure 3.11 Information Flow Digraph
22

3.3 Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness Centrality is a centrality measure in a graph which is based
on shortest paths. There exists at least one shortest path between any two given
nodes in a connected graph. Betweenness indicates how frequently a node lies
along geodesic pathways of other nodes in the network, and therefore is an
inherently asymmetric measure (Bonacich, 1972). The shortest path can be
based on either the number of edges it passes through in an unweighted graph
or the sum of weights of the edges in weighted graph is minimized.

For each node in the graph, the betweenness centrality is the number of
shortest paths which pass through that node. Betweenness Centrality can be
widely applied in the network theory. Betweenness Centrality can also be widely
applied in telecommunications networks, a node with high betweenness centrality
value means that more information will pass through that node and would have
more control over the network. Betweenness centrality can be applied to
problems in network theory, social networks, biology, transport, and scientific
cooperation.

The formula for betweenness centrality is:

𝑔(𝑣) = Σ𝑠≠𝑣≠𝑡

𝜎𝑠𝑡 – is total number of shortest paths between nodes s and t.

23

𝜎𝑠𝑡 (𝑣)
𝜎𝑠𝑡

𝜎𝑠𝑡 (𝑣)– is the total number of paths which pass through node v.
The betweenness centrality is determined by the number of paths that
pass through the node v. There can be nodes which serve as a pathway for a
couple of nodes but total number of such shortest paths that go through a given
node v in the given formula above determines the highest betweenness centrality
of that node.

Betweenness Centrality measure can be applied in unweighted and
weighted networks. Hence, we divide these two scenarios into two sections for
calculating betweenness centrality value,
Case 1. Calculating betweenness centrality in case of an unweighted
graph
Case 2: Calculating betweenness centrality in case of a weighted graph.

3.3.1 Calculating Betweenness Centrality in an Unweighted Graph
The shortest path between any two nodes is considered as a
betweenness centrality node in case of an unweighted graph. The nodes with
high betweenness centrality are the nodes which give the shortest paths.
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In figure 3.12, we are using the information flow digraph obtained and
giving it as an attribute to betweenness.centrality() function to calculate the
betweenness centrality.

Figure 3.12 Betweenness Centrality

In figure 3.13, we are using the sorted function to sort and identify the most
influential nodes using the betweenness centrality measure.

Figure 3.13 Using Betweenness Centrality and Identifying the Influential Node

From figure 3.14, we can observe that after calculating the betweenness
centrality of each node in the graph, we observe that node S12 is the most
influential node as it has a centrality value (0.186) greater than any other node
and S1 has the least centrality value (0.008). From this we can conclude that S12
is the most important node in the given graph according to betweenness
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centrality. The node S12 is the node which has been in the pathway of maximum
number of shortest paths and S1 is the node least important node in the given
graph and has been in the shortest pathway for minimum number of times.

Figure 3.14 Sorted Order of Nodes with Betweenness Centrality Values
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Figure 3.15 Code to Display Node Based on Betweenness Centrality Value

Figure 3.16 IFD with Node Size Based on Betweenness Centrality Value

From applying the betweenness centrality measure to information flow
digraph we created, we could observe that the node S12 has the highest
centrality value. To distinguish the nodes, we created a graph which represents
27

node with large centrality value as the node with larger in size and node with
least centrality value as least in size. From figure 3.16 above, we can observe
that the node S12 is the larger node in the graph, hence we can say that S12 has
the high centrality value compared to any other node in the graph as address this
node as the crucial node in this graph.

3.3.2 Calculating Betweenness Centrality in a Weighted Graph
The numerical value associated with edges are called as weights. These
weights can also be referred as “cost” of the edge. This weighted graph can be
used to represent, length, densities, duration, costs, probabilities, etc. For
example, if a telecommunications company is trying to lay a cable in new area, it
needs to bury the cable along certain path, if we consider the area as a weighted
graph with nodes as houses, with edges between them and edge weight as cost
estimated for laying the cables. Some paths can be more expensive; hence this
weighted graph can help in laying the cable with less expenditure.

The sum of the weights between the edges which connect to the nodes in
shortest path must be minimum. The nodes with high betweenness centrality are
the nodes which give the shortest paths.
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In figure 3.17, we are using the information flow digraph obtained and
giving it as an attribute to betweenness.centrality() function with a weight attribute
to calculate the betweenness centrality of graph with edge weights.

Figure 3.17 Calculating Betweenness Centrality for Weighted Graph

In figure 3.18, we are using the sorted function to sort and identify the
most influential nodes using the betweenness centrality measure in graph with
edge weights.

Figure 3.18 Using Betweenness Centrality and Identifying the Influential Node in
Weighted Digraph

From figure 3.19, we can observe that after calculating the betweenness
centrality of each node in the graph with edge weights, we can observe that node
S3 is the most influential node as it has a centrality value (0.212) greater than
any other node and O1 has the least centrality value (0.0). From this we can
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conclude that S3 is the most important node in the given graph according to
betweenness centrality. The node S3 is the node which has been in the pathway
of maximum number of shortest paths and O1 is the node least important node in
the given graph and has been in the shortest pathway for minimum number of
times.

Figure 3.19 Sorted Order of Nodes with Betweenness Centrality Values in
Weighted Digraph
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In figure 3.20, we are trying to create the graph with edge weight. The pos
argument takes the nodes as keys and positions as values and will be specified
in random_layout() function with directed graph as an input. Next, we are giving
directed graph with inputs to draw() function but draw() does not display node
labels or edge weights hence we use draw_networkx_edge_labels() with directed
graph, position, and edge_weight as edge_labels and plt.show() displays the
figure.

Figure 3.20 Code for Displaying Edge Weights
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Figure 3.21 Information Flow Digraph with Edge Weights

In figure 3.22, to create a digraph with edge weight, we give the pos
argument which takes the nodes as keys and positions as values and will be
specified in random order as we give random_layout() function with directed
graph as an input. Next, we use the get_edge_attributes() to get the weight
attribute and assign it to edge_weight. Since we apply the betweenness centrality
measure, to high highlight the node with high centrality value, we multiply
numerical value with the value of each node and give it as an input to size
variable. This size variable should be assigned to node_size attribute in the
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draw() to draw the node with high centrality value as larger nodes than the rest of
them. Since draw() function does not display node labels or edge weights, we
use draw_networkx_edge_labels() with directed graph, position, and
edge_weight as edge_labels and plt.show() to display the figure.

Figure 3.22 Code for Plotting IFD with Edge and Node Size
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Figure 3.23 Information Flow Digraph with Edge Weights and Node Size
Depending on Centrality Value

From applying the betweenness centrality measure to information flow
digraph we created, we could observe that the node S3 has the highest centrality
value. To distinguish the nodes, we created a graph which represents node with
large centrality value as the node with larger in size and node with least centrality
value as least in size. From figure 3.23 above, we can observe that the node S3
is the larger node in the graph, hence we can say that S3 has the high centrality
value compared to any other node in the graph as address this node as the
crucial node in this graph.
34

CHAPTER FOUR
INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS

4.1 General Example Applying Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness Centrality is an important measure in the whole network to
measure the influence of the node. It shows how many times the node appears in
the shortest path between any two nodes in the network.

Betweenness Centrality notion can be better understood with an example
of a social network. In this context the nodes with high betweenness centrality
are people with a greater number of connections and high level of diversity with
the connections. That means that, even if the node is not connected to many
people but has connection to nodes or people who provide diverse
communications, then that node is positioned better than any other node in the
network and will have high betweenness centrality value.

In a social network there will be nodes which have fewer connections but
higher betweenness centrality value if they provide a pathway to that part of the
network which is unreachable otherwise. The node with high degree of
connection can have low betweenness centrality, which means that it has lot of
connections within that part of network, but not so well connected to the rest of
the nodes which belong to other parts of the same network. Such nodes might
not have high influence in the network. Alternatively, there can be nodes which
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have low degree of connections but high betweenness centrality value. This
means that nodes have a smaller number of connections, but these connections
have links to other parts of the network, by making these nodes influential across
the network. Many networkers and politicians trade some betweenness centrality
as it reduces their load while maintaining their influential position within the
network.

Figure 4.1 Betweenness Centrality in Social Network

In the figure 4.1 above, Tom has the high betweenness centrality because
it is located between Jerry and Duckling who are between other entities. Jerry
and Duckling have slightly lower betweenness centrality as they are between
their own clusters and are essential to their own groups. Whereas Tom is in
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between the connecting to Jerry cluster and Duckling cluster Hence Tom has
more importance in this network and has high betweenness centrality value. Tom
has a higher influence in the network, for example tries to send a video with virus
to all other nodes being highly influential then every other user is affected, and
this can be avoided if isolated. This definition of betweenness centrality can be
adapted to multilevel security contexts, which raises several delicate questions in
terms of interpretation and tractability.

4.2 Betweenness Centrality in MLS Context
Real world networks are multi-layered and dynamic. If a node is located
on the shortest communication path connecting to other nodes, then that node is
in the central position and all other nodes are responsive to the nodes in central
positions which could influence the group by holding information. For example,
we apply Betweenness Centrality to a military network transmitting a sensitive
data file about a weapon information(weapon.exe).

4.2.1 Betweenness Centrality in Case of Unweighted Network
Military or security personnel can be divided into various levels. For the
weapon.exe file to travel from one node to another involves multiple brokers,
transporters. These are the basic components of the network while calculating
the Betweenness Centrality. If any of these nodes are polluted or compromised,
then file is polluted or contaminated as a result. The information can easily be
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reach to every node in the network fast even though this node does not have
many immediate connections.

Figure 3.16 IFD with Node Size Based on Betweenness Centrality Value

For example, if we consider the Information Flow graph obtained in
Chapter 3 as a military network. We can observe that the node O2 is one of the
nodes with high betweenness centrality value. This means that if the node O2 is
polluted or compromised, then the file weapon.exe it contains is also polluted or
compromised. This means that every other node in the network would receive
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polluted information and as a result the whole network would be compromised,
and all the nodes would get corrupted information.

4.2.2 Betweenness Centrality in Case of Weighted Network
The operations carried out through resources are assigned costs. These
costs are the numerical values assigned to edges between the nodes. These
costs can be termed as latency. In this network each shortest path is assigned to
a weight. This weight is calculated while traveling along the shortest path.

Figure 3.23 Information Flow Digraph with Edge Weights and Node Size
Depending on Centrality Value
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We could see that each node is assigned with latency. If we are trying to
send the weapon.exe file. We could observe that the node S3 has a high
betweenness value and edges with low latency. Low latency means that the file
would need less time to reach its destination in less bandwidth. The node with
low betweenness centrality value would contain edges with high latency. Which
means that this is the most important node to send weapon.exe file to all nodes
with low latency. If this node is polluted or corrupted, then the weapon.exe file
would reach all nodes in less time and affect the whole network and corrupt all
the nodes with this polluted information.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK

Conclusion
Given an Information flow digraph, we can identify which entities are most
vulnerable using Betweenness Centrality measure as it considers the whole
network and identifies which node influences the most in the network in a multilevel security context. This also helps us identify the entities that help us reaching
every other entity in the fastest way. This helps the security professionals to
identify the most important node in the polluted network. is an important measure
in the whole network to measure the influence of the node. It shows how many
times the node appears in the shortest path between any two nodes in the
network.

Future Work
There are many centrality measures like degree centrality, closeness
centrality, eigen vector centrality (). Out of all these, we implemented only
betweenness centrality algorithm on the information flow digraph. The various
centrality algorithms can be applied to interpret the vulnerability in terms of their
approaches. Furthermore, if an additional factor of security level is assigned to
nodes we interpreted in the previous sections.
Then the following questions would arise:
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1. How should we interpret this additional information?
2. If we consider a node with high importance but low security level or
node with low importance but high security level. Then can
determine the importance of the node by adding weight depending
on the security level.
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